Home > The Merk Perspective > Merk Insights > Dec 18th 2007

Leadership Emerges To Resolve Subprime Crisis

Axel Merk, December 18, 2007

True leadership may have finally emerged to resolve the subprime crisis, although it was difficult to spot during a tumultuous week at the Federal Reserve (Fed). On Tuesday, December 11, 2007, the Fed cut interest rates by 0.25%. The Dow Jones index, disappointed in what was another effort by the Fed to claim to be both on top of inflation and the crisis in the credit markets, fell about 300 points. Around 6:30pm E.T. that night, ‘sources close to the Fed’ suggested that banks would be able to borrow money from the Fed directly at rates set through an auction, rather than the discount rate set by the Fed. This was confirmed the next morning at around 8:13 am E.T., minutes before futures trading resumed, together with an announcement that foreign central banks, effective immediately, would be allowed to engage in currency swap agreements with the Fed.

The immediate interpretation was that the Fed was now so data dependent that a 300 point drop in the Dow would cause it to intervene; announcing such a move after the market closed on a day when the market closed on its lows, seemed targeted at punishing those who short the markets. Given that this was about the fourth time in as many months that Fed action whacked short sellers, criticism that the Fed intervenes in free markets, rightfully so, flared up.

Before we elaborate on what the implications of the new policies are, we need to look at another chain of events. About a minute before the Fed announced its decision on interest rates, Citigroup announced it had chosen a new CEO, Vikram Pandit. Mr. Pandit, himself relatively new to Citigroup, has a reputation of being extremely smart, but not particularly charismatic. The timing of the announcement seemed very odd. That same night, the Fed had decided to introduce its new auction facility; again, the timing was puzzling. Two days later, Citigroup announced it is moving $49 billion of off-balance sheet Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs) onto its books.


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In our analysis, there is only one reasonable explanation: these events are all linked. To understand why we come to this conclusion, one must understand a little bit more about the credit markets the SIVs operate in. Traditionally, the SIVs depended on money market funds for funding. Money market managers are notoriously risk averse; once those managers realized that asset backed commercial paper and related mortgage backed securities are not risk free, even when AAA rated, they did not want anything to do with them anymore. Attempts to create a “super-SIV”, as promoted by Treasury Secretary Paulson, were doomed to fail because the buyers were gone for good. That doesn’t mean that no one wants to touch these papers, just not money market managers. However, those other potential buyers want to be rewarded for the risk they take on by offering substantially lower prices. However, the financial industry had been fighting this day of reckoning, hoping the problem would somehow go away. That’s also the main reason we have been critical of the Fed rate cuts: this wasn’t a liquidity problem, this has been a valuation problem all along. While lower interest rates would typically help in a crisis, it doesn’t help when those affected have an enormous disincentive to allow price discovery to take place. The disincentive is that price discovery may cause extreme strain on major financial institutions, to seriously disrupt the world financial system.

One of the bottlenecks has been that SIVs cannot go to the Fed to ask for money. Unless a clause in the Fed’s charter is invoked that, to our knowledge, has never been invoked, only banks can; by being off balance sheet, SIVs are in an extremely tight spot to survive without imploding. Add to that a sense of urgency: a lot of institutions roll their debt at the end of a year, or early in a year. Given how the holidays fall this year, liquidity in the best of markets is likely to dry up at noon London time on December 21st.

Stressing that this is our interpretation without first hand knowledge, it seems clear to us that Vikram Pandit went to Citigroup’s board and told them that the right thing to do is to take the SIVs onto Citigroup’s books. That way, they can ask the Fed to help with any interim financing should the need arise. More importantly, by being on Citigroup’s books, Citigroup provides an urgently overdue mechanism for price discovery. On the books, the securities can be sold to risk-friendly investors. Free markets ought to have a mechanism for price discovery; this move may be the catalyst.

It also explains why the Fed announced the new auction facility the same night. Rather than trying to yank the markets, the Fed likely lived up to its promise to provide immediate support. There is no time to be lost given the huge amounts involved and the little time left in the year.

There’s only one item that does not fit into the chain of events: why would Goldman Sachs upgrade Citigroup as a result? While we do not give an investment recommendation on the stock, the fact that Citigroup swallows a tough and necessary medicine does not mean the share price should go up. It has been widely reported that Citigroup’s capital base is getting to be stretched by moving the SIVs onto the books. Citigroup must raise further capital to retain its flexibility. Given the ownership structure of Citigroup, a common stock issuance is a likely avenue, unless Saudi Prince Alwaleed will provide money through a preferred or convertible stock offering; other avenues may upset the largest Citigroup shareholder as it would further unduly reduce his rights. No matter how Citigroup intends to shore up its capital base, it is likely to negatively impact the share price.

Also note that while we believe that it is good news for the financial system that we are on the way of finding a mechanism for price discovery, we are in the beginning, not the end of the process. Other financial institutions must follow suit, and prices must be adjusted downward, radically so. Those still under the illusion that we can get through this crisis without losses will need to learn faster if they want to survive. Citigroup under its new leadership seems to know what the stakes are, and seems to show leadership in addressing its problems.

A couple more comments on the new auction facility. If our understanding is correct, it allows banks to set interest rates, similar as to how interest rates are set at Treasury auctions. If banks collude, they got themselves not a 0.25% interest cut, but an interest cut exceeding 2%. The window also seems open ended, providing as much liquidity as the market may demand. Another feature may be that the money obtained from the Fed cannot be added to banks’ reserves, i.e. they cannot leverage on that money to make new loans. This lack of multiplier may force the Fed to provide enormous amounts; this collateral would then also sit on the Fed’s books. While the Fed has a blank checkbook, for political purposes, it may look bad if the Fed owns over hundred billion in sub-prime paper that banks have loaded off to them. The criticism that you and I may want to give the Fed our old snowmobile in exchange for cash is well placed.

The other major announcement by the Fed affected a deal worked out with central banks around the world to provide a currency swap facility. This is something that financial institutions outside of the U.S. have desperately sought. If a European bank owns U.S. subprime paper, they ask for euro from the European Central Bank (ECB). While the ECB has been very forthcoming providing euro, U.S. dollars had been hard to come by. This new facility will provide enormous short-term relief to many SIVs in Europe. There, just as in the U.S., the primary concern are refinancing obligations late this year and early next year.

We saw the U.S. dollar stage a significant rally last week. It is always difficult to pinpoint the reasons for short-term currency moves. But we would not be surprised if the new swap facility allowed pent-up demand by SIVs to buy U.S. dollars to be satisfied; this may have been amplified by profit taking of speculators. Our outlook for 2008 remains unchanged, but the turmoil in the credit markets may well contribute to additional volatility in all markets.

We manage the Merk Hard Currency Fund, a fund that seeks to profit from a potential decline in the dollar. We provide exposure to a basket of hard currencies without investing in equities; we also try to minimize interest risk.

To learn more about the Fund, or to subscribe to our free newsletter, please visit www.merkfunds.com.

Axel Merk
Manager of the Merk Hard Currency Fund, www.merkfunds.com.

The Merk Hard Currency Fund is a no-load mutual fund that invests in a basket of hard currencies from countries with strong monetary policies assembled to protect against the depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies. The Fund may serve as a valuable diversification component as it seeks to protect against a decline in the dollar while potentially mitigating stock market, credit and interest risks—with the ease of investing in a mutual fund.

The Fund may be appropriate for you if you are pursuing a long-term goal with a hard currency component to your portfolio; are willing to tolerate the risks associated with investments in foreign currencies; or are looking for a way to potentially mitigate downside risk in or profit from a secular bear market. For more information on the Fund and to download a prospectus, please visit www.merkfunds.com.

Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks and charges and expenses of the Merk Hard Currency Fund carefully before investing. This and other information is in the prospectus, a copy of which may be obtained by visiting the Fund's website at www.merkfunds.com or calling 866-MERK FUND. Please read the prospectus carefully before you invest.

The Fund primarily invests in foreign currencies and as such, changes in currency exchange rates will affect the value of what the Fund owns and the price of the Fund’s shares. Investing in foreign instruments bears a greater risk than investing in domestic instruments for reasons such as volatility of currency exchange rates and, in some cases, limited geographic focus, political and economic instability, and relatively illiquid markets. The Fund is subject to interest rate risk which is the risk that debt securities in the Fund’s portfolio will decline in value because of increases in market interest rates. As a non-diversified fund, the Fund will be subject to more investment risk and potential for volatility than a diversified fund because its portfolio may, at times, focus on a limited number of issuers. The Fund may also invest in derivative securities which can be volatile and involve various types and degrees of risk. For a more complete discussion of these and other Fund risks please refer to the Fund’s prospectus.

The views in this article were those of Axel Merk as of the newsletter's publication date and may not reflect his views at any time thereafter. These views and opinions should not be construed as investment advice nor considered as an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy shares of any securities mentioned herein. Mr. Merk is the founder and president of Merk Investments LLC and is the portfolio manager for the Merk Hard Currency Fund. Foreside Fund Services, LLC, distributor.

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